Limiting Protection

In his chapter "Making Trade Fair," Stiglitz explores the issue of the misuse of nontariff barriers to control markets. He divides all such nontariff barriers into the categories of safeguards, dumping duties, technical barriers, and rules of origin and then demonstrates how each has been used by developed countries to limit developing nations' abilities to export their goods to the United States. Operating under the assumption that a nation should not protect its domestic markets, Stiglitz makes some very convincing arguements concerning the misuse of such tactics. It seems, however, that the solutions he offers do not adequately address the difficulty of moving developed nations away from protectionist tactics. At the end of each of these sections, Stiglitz returns to his suggestion that an international tribunal of some sort is needed to resolve all disputes concerning the misuse of such nontariff barriers.

I agree that such a tribunal would be needed to effectively resolve such disputes, yet I am not convinced of the possibility for the existence of such a tribunal. Convincing any developed nation to submit to the judgment of an international tribunal that might (or would definately) limit its ability to protect certain domestic markets will be a difficult task indeed. If one were successfully created, I am doubtful that its authority would hold. If the people of these nations cannot be made to understand the need (moral, economic, or else) for preventing protectionism, the corresponding governments will be hardpressed to make changes. I am anxious to see if Stiglitz explores, in further depth, what such a tribunal would look like and how its authority would be maintained when developed nations believe they have a legitimate cause to protect a certain market.