Response to Stiglitz "Saving the Planet"

Perhaps the biggest issue to arise from today’s readings is the difficulty of ensuring that environmental policies are not used as a disguise for simply protectionist measures. How do you prevent nations from digging up dirt on other states in search for justification to adopt a protectionist policy? The idea presented by Stiglitz that states ought to be able to apply trade sanctions to those which refuse to lower pollution emissions seems fair on surface, but the implementation of such an enforcement measure would likely be chaotic. I would tend to agree with those “senior officials” of advanced industrial countries, of whom Stiglitz speaks, who liken such a proposal to impose sanctions and duties on the goods of the polluting nation to a declaration of trade war (Stiglitz, 178). Perhaps such an extreme measure would indeed prompt the United States to clean up quickly, perhaps not. Even if it does work, there is a substantial chance that similar tactics would be more readily used in the future for less serious cases. If trade sanctions are deemed to be an appropriate response for dealing with other nations whose policies violate the others ethics or ideals, there would be almost no limit to instances when such measures could be used. It seems that there would also be a greater occurrence of sanctions and duties being used bilaterally, giving stronger nations ample opportunity to prey on the weaker. Environmental policies may well become less ethical than opportunistic, being used only when a government recognizes an opportunity to take advantage of a justification for protection.

The best idea presented by Stiglitz is that of a common emissions tax. This plan is the better of the two primarily because it allows a country to control emissions while at the same time increasing revenue from the emissions tax. I am not, however, entirely convinced that this is a realistic possibility. Trying to think through how such a tax would be decided upon and established is mind-boggling. A plan like this requires (in the absence of the kinds of sanctions just discussed) the voluntary participation of governments. Such a tax might be much easier to levy in non-democratic state, than it would be in the United States. I simply cannot imagine that politicians in the United States (at least not enough to make a difference) would be willing to make the kind of risk associated with the implementation of such a tax. For it to work, the people will have to be convinced of the necessity of cleaning up emissions. Right now there is simply not enough concern among the American population to support such a movement.

It appears as though there is no good plan for implementing a world-wide clean up of emissions that does not involve the United States taking leadership. Like was the case with Kyoto, the US is likely to reject a proposal to meet a target level for emissions. There is simply no way to accurately measure what a necessary and realistic target level is. For changes to take place quickly and smoothly, the US needs to take the helm of leadership. The American people will be more agreeable to change if they feel as though the US is in charge (sorry, but that is just the way that it is), and the people need to be on board before anyone in power is willing to risk political capital to pursue an environmental agenda. It does not seem as though much will transpire until the American people are convinced of the need for such reform. I am not quite sure how to get to this point. Are Americans simply disinterested or are they uninformed?